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Abstract
Reformist British South Asian Twelver Shia Muslims emphasise practising Shia Islam
in daily life beyond the month of Muharram by living a piety-led life; they encourage
their followers to ‘become’ a Shia Muslim rather than just ‘being’ one. The reformist
British South Asian Shia ulama, mostly trained in Shia seminaries based in Qom and
Najaf, advocate the adoption of an Islamic life-style compatible with the economic,
political and social challenges British Muslims face. Many British South Asian Shia
Muslims view these piety narratives with contempt. They consider that the narratives
on living a piety-led life privilege Islamic lifestyle like praying and reciting the Qur’an
daily over Muharram ritual commemorations. These Shia Muslims see the growing
popularity of piety-narrative as an apologetic response by Shia reformists to the
growing influence of Salafis and the Tablighi Jamaat in Sunni Muslim public spheres.
This paper is based on nine months of ethnographic fieldwork among British South
Asian Twelver Shia Muslims in London, Birmingham and Bradford. The centrality of
commemorating Muharram rituals in Shia Islam becomes contested when reformist
Shia Muslims extend the piety-led lifestyle beyond the month of Muharram. This
article revisits the anthropological lens of iltizam (commitment) in available studies
on piety among Muslim communities. Thus, iltizam for the reformists and religiously
upwardly mobile Shia Muslims means subscribing to a globally standardised interpre-
tation of practising Shia Islam that compliments the aspirations of Iran-based Shia
religious establishment. For other Shia Muslims, iltizam with Shia Islam is in (i)
reenacting the continuity of South Asian ways of commemorating Muharram ritual in
Britain and, (ii) opposing the Wahhabi trends in Shia Islam that are endorsed and
encouraged by reformist British South Asian Shia Muslims.
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This article provides ethnographic accounts of emerging narrative by reformist British
South Asian Shia Muslims on living a piety-led Islamic life beyond the month of
Muharram.1 The article analyses this narrative and its manifest emphasis on practising
Islam in daily life throughout the year as British South Asian Shia Muslims would do
during the month of Muharram. The article evaluates the utility of iltizam (commit-
ment/pledge) as a category of analysis, recently used in anthropological works dealing
with piety among Muslim communities (Schielke 2009, 2010; Deeb 2011), and
assesses the relevance of ilitizam in studying Shia Islam. I discuss the ethnographic
accounts of daily struggles, negotiations and responses about being or becoming a Shia
Muslim in Britain. The ethnographic accounts dwell on the popularity, acceptability
and contestation of different interpretations on how to live a piety-led life beyond
Muharram among two groups of British South Asian Shia Muslims.
For the purpose of analysis in this article, I describe one group of British Shia ulama
(religious scholars; sing. alim) and their followers as reformists. Members and followers
of the reformist group mostly come from upwardly mobile middle classes, young
volunteers, and social and political activists. Reformists encourage Shia Muslims to
become ‘Islamic modern’ (Deeb 2011). Reformists encourage their followers to live a
modern life by gaining worldly achievements and success in education, career, business
and community affairs. In addition, members and followers are reminded by reformists
that they would only become Shia Muslims if they preserve their Shia identity by
practising fundamental Islamic tenets like praying five times a day, reciting the Qur’an
regularly, fasting during Ramadan, and observing Shia Islam actively throughout the
year. Thus, for reformists, combining worldly achievements with preserving and
asserting Islamic identity in public sphere, serves as an ideal type of Muslim conduct
for daily life. Generally, reformists and their followers have sound understanding of the
scholarly traditions of Shia Islam.Most have direct religious learning and exposure from
Shia seminaries based in cities like Qom, Mashhad, Najaf, and Karbala in the Middle
East (Zahab 2010).
Here, I am using the terms ‘Shia Islamic reform’ or ‘reformism’ to have similar
meanings as those advanced by Robinson (2008). Islamic reform for Robinson is
Muslim ulama and/or authoritative figures asserting a renewed notion of individual
behaviour to practise and perform Islam. They do it by making Islam compatible with
the challenges and requirements of daily life in a particular space and time. In this
article, I interpret Islamic reformism among British South Asian Shia Muslims as an
attempt by ulama, leaders and their followers to come up with a standardised, global
and authoritative reinterpretation of how to become a Shia Muslim in belief and
practice. This reinterpretation meets the adherent’s needs in religious and social life,
responds to challenges of western modernity and recent global political crises as well as
contributes to the theological critique on Sunni Islam by addressing the misconceptions
about Shia Islam among Sunni Muslims.
The reformist narrative on living a piety-led life beyond the month of Muharram
attempts to introduce a renewed sense of religious identity by reinterpreting a few
1 Muharram, the first month in the Islamic calendar, is the most significant time in the Shia Muslim religious
calendar, marked with the commemorations of the martyrdom of third Shia Imam, Husayn ibn ‘Ali. The
commemorations continue for first ten days rigorously, culminating on the tenth day, ‘Ashura’. During
Muharram, Shia Muslims observe rituals and participate in commemoration gatherings with religious
devotion.
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features of being a South Asian Shia Muslim in the UK. First, the reformist narrative
evokes a sense of responsibility and commitment (iltizam) in Shia Muslims by pro-
mulgating a religious consciousness to Islamise the self, other Shia and the rest of the
world; second, this narrative promotes a sense of belonging to a globalised Shia identity
by performing standardised ritual commemorations; third, Shia Muslims are sensitized
to respond to political affairs with one voice; fourth, the reformist narrative accepts the
central authority of religiously-trained ulama and maraji2 when it comes to responding
collectively to any socio-political situation; fifth, the narrative disparages certain South
Asian cultural practices during Muharram commemorations which are revered signif-
icantly by some South Asian Shia Muslims. Similar trends of Islamic reformism have
been studied among South Asian Sunni Muslims in the nineteenth century, particularly
after the end of the Mughal Empire (Metcalf 1982; Robinson 2008; Reetz 2006).
Almost a century later, the Iranian revolution in 1979, created the similar effect of
Islamic reform among Shia Muslims in minority contexts and among the migrant
communities (Roy 2010; Mervin 2010), although the contestations on performance
of Muharram rituals already began in the early twentieth century.
The other group of British South Asian Shia Muslims prefers practising Islam
through maintaining the supremacy of the ritual commemorations during Muhar-
ram over living a piety-led life beyond Muharram. This group believes in the
continuity of South Asian traditions of commemorating Muharram (Dogra 2017)
is a central mark of Shia identity. The South Asian tradition of Shia Islam in the
UK is largely centered around and manifests itself in diverse and often contested
public expressions of Muharram rituals (Spellman-Poots 2012; Dogra 2017) to
commemorate the martyrs of the Battle of Karbala (680 CE). In this battle, the
grandson of Prophet Muhammad and third Imam of Twelver Shia Muslims,
Husayn ibn ‘Ali (625–680), was martyred along with male members of his family
by the ruling Umyyad forces. This was a critical event in Islamic history, known
as Ashura (10th day of Muharram), with profound effects on the prevalent schism
in Islam until today. Shia Muslims of South Asian origins in the UK reproduce the
South Asian (mainly Pakistani and North Indian) ways of commemorating Ashura
rituals during the month of Muharram. This is done by organising majalis (reli-
gious gatherings; sing. majlis) in Urdu and Punjabi, performing severe zangir zani
(sever self-flagellation with blades and knives) by men, and leading Ashura
processions in British streets with a decorated horse symbolising zuljina (the horse
that Husayn ibn ‘Ali rode during the Battle of Karbala). Shia Muslims of South
Asian origins recite Urdu, Punjabi, Sindhi and Pashtu marsiya (eulogies) and noha
(lamentations) for the martyrs of Karbala with veneration. They exaggerate the
spiritual stations and bravery of the martyrs of Karbala. They display an alam
(flag associated with martyr ‘Abbas ibn ‘Ali, step-brother of Husayn ibn ‘Ali),
distribute langar (food) and organise sabil (serving juices and sweet drinks).
Zealous participation in the annual observance of Muharram ritual commemora-
tions is understood as being a pious Shia Muslim among British South Asians.
The public performance and commemoration of these rituals among British South
Asian Shia Muslims, however, has not been homogeneous since last couple of decades.
2 The source of emulation for a Shia Muslim to follow, usually a trained religious scholar or an ayatollah with
established scholarly and religious credentials.
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Each group of Shia Muslims performs diverse and often contested public expressions to
commemorate the Battle of Karbala in London (Dogra 2017) and elsewhere in Britain.
Nonetheless, these commemorations during Muharram are the most revered occasions
for some adherents to give ritual performances as an expression of the most authentic
form of practising Shia Islam. For reformists and activists, the same Muharram ritual
commemorations become the sites for extending the notions of piety and expanding the
scope of practising Shia Islam beyond the month of Muharram.
Shia Muslims in South Asian contexts have been highly visible, in terms of their
annual Muharram processions and ritual commemorations, not only during Muharram
but throughout the year by holding majalis in the communities they live in; however,
until recently, they were invisible in scholarly terms (Robinson 2015). The available
studies on Shia Islam in general and South Asian Shia Islam in particular, focus on the
marja’ al-taqlid,3 reformist Shia ulama trained in Iran and Iraq, Shia ritual commem-
orations, Shia-Sunni relations, and wealthy and politically influential individuals and
Shia families (Bayly 1985; Cole 2002; Zaman 1998; Hussein 2005; Pinault 2011;
Fuchs 2014; Corboz 2015; Kamran and Shahid 2015). Most of the studies emphasise
exploring the transnational networks and connections of Shia maraji’, their family
relations and inter-marriages and how these maraj’ and ‘ulama’ are shaping the
political and religious discourse by advancing Shia responses to local, national and
global events (Litvak 2001; Louer 2012; Mervin 2010; Scharbrodt 2011; Khan 2014).
However, there is a dearth of scholarship in the existing literature on Shia Islam about
the viewpoints of the often neglected and so-called ordinary or common Shia Muslims
(Fibiger 2015) on contemporary scholarly, religious and political developments
(Shanneik et al. 2017). The subjective and personal reception by Shia Muslims to the
scholarly discourses on living a piety-led life, as they are disseminated by Qom and
Najaf trained ulama, is a missing link in the existing scholarship on Shia Islam. This
problem becomes more pertinent in case of British South Asian Shia Muslims, who
constitute a numerical majority (Muslim Council of Britain Report 2015, Ansari 2018)
among British Shi’i; yet they do not have enough representation; neither among the
Shia religious leaders and authoritative figures in the form of clerical leadership
(maraji) nor in the institutional field of the organised Shia Islam (Scharbrodt 2018)
as the fieldwork based observations inform.4
This article is based on the multiple ethnographic fieldwork which I conducted on
various occasions during October 2014 –October 2017 with British South Asian Shia
Muslims London, Birmingham and Bradford. I conducted multi-sited ethnographic
fieldwork at various locations in the UK for nine months, conducting 68 participant
observations of majalis, 44 interviews, and 50 informal discussions with small groups.
Out of total amount of data that I collected, a representative selection of ethnographic
data has been used in this article. I used pseudonyms for all the research participants in
this article.
The emphasis on living a piety-led Islamic life before, during and after the month of
Muharram is becoming popular among some sections of Shia Muslims. Reformist
British South Asian Shia speakers assert that the objective of Muharram
3 Same as maraji, source of emulation
4 Most of the maraji’, Shia authoritative figures or scholarly Shia Islamic centers in the UK are of Middle
Eastern origins, either Iranian or Iraqi backgrounds.
Contemporary Islam
commemorations is learning to live a piety-led life beyond Muharram. The reformist
speakers aim at inculcating a renewed understanding of piety, which not only becomes
evident through an adherent’s public performance of religiosity like praying five times
a day, reciting the Qur’an and learning about the teachings of Islam, but also through an
emphasis on changing physical appearance of a Muslim in public, his/her social life and
an enhanced personal engagement with the propagation of Shia Islamic activities
(Zahab 2010; Brunner 2009; Deeb and Harb 2013). The emphasis on living a piety-
led life beyond Muharram questions the centrality of ritual commemorations as the
piety peak of observing Shia Islam for some British Shia Muslims. The reformists
define Muharram commemorations as a medium to enable Shia Muslims to live a piety-
led life before and after Muharram.
Emphasis on living piety-led life as a priority over the centrality of Muharram
commemorations is not absolutely unique to the British South Asian reformists. The
Shii piety narratives in South Asia originated almost a century ago (Naqvi 1942),
although these were never accepted by mainstream Shia Muslims in South Asia (Jones
2014; Fuchs 2014; Dogra 2017). A minority of scholars and ulama in South Asia
propagated living a piety-led life beyond Muharram and their followers were dubbed as
‘Wahhabi Shia’, by majority of Shia Muslims in Pakistan. It is pivotal to contextualise
the historical continuity of this contestation in South Asia and its contemporary
transnational ramifications in Britain. The ethnographic accounts in this article become
self-explanatory if the genealogy of Shii piety narrative in South Asia is juxtaposed to
the same in Britain.
Emergence of Wahhabi Shia: the South Asian genealogy of piety
narratives
Jones (2014) traces out the historical origins of the piety narratives and finds them
embedded in the South Asian Shii writings depicting third Shia Imam, Husayn ibn
‘Ali’s life and death as a role model for living a piety-led life. Jones (2014) maintains
that Syed Ali Naqi Naqvi (1905–1988) wrote hagiography of Husayn ibn’ Ali (1942)
which presents Husyan as an ideal, perfect and devout Muslim. Popular Shia beliefs
about Husayn ibn ‘Ali view him as someone possessing power of intercession with
capacity to directly communicate with Allah. Naqvi’s depiction of Husayn ibn ‘Ali
divorces all elements of mythical powers of intercession and divinity that are
commonly associated with Husyan and are part of popular Shii beliefs in South Asia.
Naqvi (1942) presents him as a moral role-model and does not mention him commu-
nicating with Allah directly at the time of his martyrdom. Jones (2014) proposes that
depiction of Husayn as a moral exemplar, contrary to popular beliefs, needs to be
viewed in the milieu of early twentieth century South Asia. During this time, puritan
and reformist movements among Sunni Muslims actively disseminated the narratives
of demystification of Sufi saints and emphasised this-worldly aspects of their lives
(Metcalf 1982; Robinson 2008). Such a this-worldly identity of the ahl al-bayt5 devoid
of mythical and intercessory powers was perceived with resentment in the popular
5 According to Shia Muslims views, the five member of the family of Prophet Muhammad (Muhammad,
Fatima, ‘Ali, Hasan and Husayn).
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imagination of South Asian Shia Muslims. The proponents of this-worldly identity of
ahl al-bayt are rebuked as ‘Wahhabi Shia’ in majalis by the majority of South Asian
Shia Muslims.
The contemporary emphasis on living a piety-led life in South Asia can be found in
the works and religio-political activism of Shia scholar, Muhammad Hussain Dhakku
(b. 1933). Dhakku condemned the traditional Shia ulama and zaker6 in Pakistan for
only speaking about the exaggerated mythical powers of the ahl al-bayt and not
educating Shia Muslims to follow them as role models (Fuchs 2014). Dhakku accused
traditional Pakistani Shia ulama for their opposition to the establishment of madrassa
(Islamic seminaries) as their strategy to keep the Shia populace at a distance from
textual knowledge about the true beliefs of Shia Islam. Dhakku emphasised that Shia
speakers, zaker (poetry reciters) and ulama needed education along with people (Rieck
2016) about living a piety-led life.
Another Pakistani Shia scholar and activist, Arif Hussain Alhussaini (1946–1988)
took a third position, in opposition to both traditional ulama controlling the pulpit and
reformist ulama controlling madrassa. His political activism, somewhat, strengthened
the reformists but at the same time he accused them of narrowing down the wider
political and religious aspects of Shia Islam (Fuchs 2014). When Alhussaini organised
a conference on ‘Qur’an and Sunna (ways of Prophet)’ in collaboration with Sunni
Muslims in Lahore, the traditional Shia ulama organised a conference titled ‘Qur’an
and the ahl al-bayt’ on the same day (Fuchs 2014).
The life and works of piety-beyond-Muharram-driven Shia ulama like Naqvi,
Dhakku, and Alhussaini in South Asia paved the way for some British South
Asian Shia Muslims to adopt the piety narrative without resentment. What was
viewed as Wahhabi trends within Shia Islam in South Asia became the main-
stream narrative among British South Asian Shia Muslims with a little opposi-
tion from within, as the ethnography in this article informs. This could only
happen in the context of globalized hyper-diversity in Britain where British
South Asian Shii are interacting and engaging with their Iranian and Iraqi
counterparts on almost daily basis. Just like the Salafi/Wahhabi puritanical
trends became popular among second and third generation of British South
Asians Sunni Muslims, the piety narratives gained popularity among young and
religiously upwardly mobile British South Asian Shia Muslims. The reformist
British Shia Muslims have their transnational religious engagements with Shia
Islam between South Asia and Iran/Iraq. The popularity of piety narratives
faced opposition and the prioritization of living a piety-led life over ritual
commemoration during Muharram became a divisive issue in London (Dogra
2017). The mainstreaming of ‘Wahhabi Shia’ trends offer another analytical
angle for anthropologists writing on piety in Muslim societies to revisit their
own conceptions of Muslim piety. The desirability to act as pious and good
Muslims can be located and discovered in the British South Asian Shia
Muslims’ pursuits of either ‘being’ or ‘becoming’ a Shia Muslim. Thus, ‘being
or becoming’ offers an ontological turn for a Shia Muslim to connect with Shia
Islam as well as it does the same for an anthropologist to revisit Muslim piety
by looking beyond the observable expressions of piety.
6 Eulogy (marsiya) and lamentation (noha) poetry reciters who are paid to recite before and after the majalis.
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Problematising the anthropological approach on piety in Muslim
societies
Recent anthropological debates have focused on the significance of piety by consider-
ing its micro and macro manifestations in the public sphere of Muslim societies. The
works of Mahmood (2005), Marsden (2005), Soares and Osella (2009), Schielke
(2009), and Deeb (2011) delineate the notions of piety and its relevance in daily life
of Muslims around the world. Mahmood (2005) views growing personal and public
expressions of piety in Muslim societies as ethical self-fashioning; whereby pious
Muslims create coherence in their daily lives through opting for an ethical disposition
that doesn’t have to belong to any Islamic revival movement necessarily or attempt to
challenge western modernity. Other anthropologists extend their analysis about the role
of living a piety-led life by locating it in the broader social, economic and political
contexts in which Muslim subjectivities are producing, reproducing and responding to
the metanarratives of modernity, globalisation, and consumption.
I argue that the emerging discourses by Shia reformists on living a piety-led life beyond
Muharram is neither an isolated phenomenon of renewed religiosity nor does it aims for the
salvation in the after-life only. Rather, by emphasising on living a piety-led life beyond
Muharram, Shia reformists attempt to reproduce uniform Shia Islamic practices in ethnically
diverse Shia populations in Britain. The Shia reformists represent themselves as an alternative
Muslim umma (imagined community of Muslims) to Sunni Muslims as well as to westren
countries and reinforce a standardised global identity of Shia Muslims. They attempt to
provide an alternative Islamicated modernity as a normative code offering guidelines on how
to live Shia Islam in daily life and become a Shia Muslim in contemporary Britain. The
construction of successful-modern-pious identity with its uplifting moral subjectivities may
seem appealing for upwardly mobile Shia religious sentiments; however, there is a section of
British SouthAsian ShiaMuslimswho responds to the perceived standardised Islamisation of
their daily lives by reformists with contempt, distaste and suspicion. These Shia Muslims do
not subscribe to the reformist narrative on becoming Muslims by living a piety-led life
beyond themonth ofMuharram.At the same time, these ShiaMuslims are religiously aswell
as politically disenfranchised from the project of standardising Shia Islam and its underlying
pro-Iranian notion of Shia globalism (Dogra 2017).However, opposing reformist narrative on
living a piety-led life beyondMuharramneithermakes them any less ambitious aboutworldly
achievement and success in career or business, nor reduces their commitment with Shia
Islam. ShiaMuslims of South Asian origins in the UK are no exception to the inevitability of
contesting the very notion of piety, its meanings (Hegland 1998) and most importantly, how
to express it publically in accordance with the tenants of Twelver Shia Islam.
Deeb (2011) advances the debate of piety politics and its relationship to the wider
Shia Muslim public sphere. Deeb (2011) argues that anthropological discourses on
Muslim piety in the public sphere either deal with the Habermasian notion of the public
sphere (Habermas 1991) and how it has shaped Muslim subjectivities, or they limit
pious subjectivities to a ethical self-fashioning as Mahmood (2005) would argue.
Habermasian view on participation in public sphere restricts it to the educated, bour-
geoisie and middle-class only (Reetz 2006). The Habermasian understanding of public
sphere emphases on deliberative and communicative aspects of generating a discourse
by educated activists. In case of British Shia Muslims, the public sphere effectively
becomes a monopoly of reformist ulama and activists. Soares and Osella (2009) argue
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that the emphasis on ethical self-fashioning in anthropological debates about piety have
an inherent tendency to ignore or overlook macro-politics within and around Muslim
societies. Both argue that neither reducing the relationship between politics and Islam
to the epiphenomenon of Islam nor associating piety-mindedness of Muslims to their
ethical self-disposition is helpful in understanding how Islam is lived by Muslims (12).
Thus, the nuances around Muslim piety cannot be studied with a linear or deterministic
approach. This article proposes that understanding Muslim piety by pitting it against
secular/liberal westernised individual sensibilities or approaching Muslim piety through
western prism of secularity and how it normalises liberal ethos of so-called everyday
life would be counter-productive and limit the scope of debate and analysis.
Living piety in daily life is the public practice of authenticating Islam (Deeb 2011).
By performing piety, Deeb maintains that Shia Muslims publically manifest the gains
of their moral and worldly achievements as an authentication and verification of them
being ‘Islamic-modern’. Deeb, however, constructs the concept of visible piety making
Lebanese Shia Muslims as ‘Islamic-modern’ by tracing its origin in the commonly
shared idea of iltizam (commitment, pledge) amongst them. By becoming multazim
(committed), Lebanese Shia Muslims assert their identity in an integrated sense at the
community level. A Shia Muslims’ iltizam functions in practising Islam as an alterna-
tive to the Western lifestyle. Schielke (2009) also presents the similar notion of being
morally committed (multazim) by practising Islam among young Egyptians who
negotiate the social and economic aspects of life within Islamic reference point vis-à-
vis western influences. I expand the meanings and utilisation of ilitizam and its relation
in becoming a pious-modern Muslim by locating it in the lives of reformists as well as
those British South Asian Shia Muslims, who reject reformist narratives of living a
piety-led life beyond Muharram. This allows exploring prevalence of the analytical
category of iltizam in the lives of those Shia Muslims who don't subscribe to the Islamic
reform project and who resent it in some ways. Exploring iltizam in what may
otherwise constitute everyday life of Muslims in anthropological works, helps in
deconstructing the myth upheld by reformist Muslims and by some anthropologists
alike that Muslims outside the Islamic reform project are not Islamic enough and when
they live everyday life, they compromise or negotiate being Muslim (Marsden 2005;
Schielke 2009; Deeb 2011). This alternative, or the non-reformist way of being pious
for British South Asian Shia Muslims is to believe in the centrality of commemorating
rituals during Muharram as utmost expression of piety. Iltizam for them is to participate
in annual ritual commemoration with zeal and devotion. The purpose of discussing
iltizam in the daily lives of these British South Asian Shia Muslims is to shed light on
their pious subjectivities and make these subjectivities a part of contemporary academic
debates on how Islam is lived. By doing this, I aim to disentangle the anthropological
practice of analysing piety by locating its expressions within the realm of any kind of
Islamic reform project in Muslim societies.
For Deeb and Schielke, more visibility of being Muslim and practicing Islam in
public life equates with being pious-modern and feeling multazim (pledged/committed)
among the Muslims. This might be partly true in the case of reformist Muslims. The
renewed sense of religiosity among reformist British South Asian Shia Muslims and its
public performance responds to local and global affairs such as terrorist attacks in
Britain and Europe, sectarian unrest in the Middle East, and the changing or troubled
religio-political landscapes in places where Shia Muslims are minority. Hence, the
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emphasis on living a piety-led life beyond Muharram not only endorses an enhanced
religiosity and its public visibility by becoming a devout Shia Muslim; it also aligns the
personal, social and political subjectivities of an individual with wider socio-political
contexts by making them multazim with Shia Islam. This, however, happens at the cost
of excluding or demonising those who don’t subscribe to the reformist standardisation
of Shia Islam in Britain. Developing a direct and linear relationship between visibility
of practising Islam and iltizam overlooks or ignores the majority of British and South
Asian Shia Muslims who might not be visible Muslims yet remain multazim with Shia
Islam, as the ethnography below reveals.
Becoming Shia: reformist narrative on living a piety-led life
beyond Muharram
Reformist Shia speakers and their followers endorse modern, successful, and devout
Islamic lives in public sphere. Kazmi, who migrated to the UK from Lucknow, India, is
a popular Shia speaker who received his religious qualifications in Qom, Iran. He
delivers sermons in the majalis in a husayniyya (Shia Islamic Centre) in London during
Muharram and on other occasions. During one of his lectures, he said:
Being a Shia means to be proud of your identity. Why do we hesitate in
representing ourselves at public forums where other Muslims are invited to
speak? Your conduct in daily life should be best in whatever role you have to
perform. You should be best student, best engineer, best teacher, best political
leader, best taxi driver and best member of your families etc. Muharram is the
time for Shia Muslims to store enough spiritual energy that will keep you pious
and make you perform best in your work throughout the year.
Kazmi depicts the life of a devout British Shia Muslim as one where piety is exhibited
in work and business while facing the challenges of Western modernity. He encourages
the Shia youth to show their commitment (iltizam) with Shia Islam by reading the
Qur’an daily, knowing the Islamic discourses on the life of the ahl al-bayt, and
confidently representing the Shia Muslim in all walks of life. For Kazmi, it is essential
that ulama educate and train Shia Muslims on how to live a piety-led life beyond
Muharram and fulfill their responsibility for the wider Shia community. However, some
members at a husayniyya in North London have subscribed to the narratives of living a
piety-led life because of their own personal interests and experiences. I met Jawad at a
husayniyya in North London. Jawad migrated to UK from a rural district in Punjab,
Pakistan, in the early 1990s. Jawad told me:
In the early 1980s, religio-political developments among Pakistani Shia were ‘hot
and new’ after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. I visited Iran and met
Ayatollah Khomeini. Afterwards I was a changed person as a Muslim and
became an active member of the Imamia Students Organisation (ISO).7 I
7 Imamia Student Organisation (ISO) is a Shia student’s organisation operating in Pakistan. After the Islamic
Revolution in 1979, ISO has been instrumental in mobilising Shia students and youth in Pakistan.
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introduced offering daily prayers before or after ISO meetings college mosque
and in the husayniyya before the majlis. Unfortunately, the majority of Shia
Muslims in Pakistan only know how to say loudly ‘Nara-e-Haideri – Ya Ali’
[the popular slogan or proclamation of calling for Ali ibn Abi Talib in Shia public
gatherings in South Asia], but they have forgotten how to follow the character of
‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. In Pakistan, Shia Muslims only know how to raise loud
slogans, do sever self-flagellation, cry loud and shed tears in majlis, eat food and
leave. Here, in the UK, it is more about doing prayers, reciting the Qur’an and
practising Islam in daily life along with attending majalis.
Jawad became a devout Shia Muslim after receiving direct learning from institutions based
in Iran. His critique targets fellow Shia Muslims’ carelessness in reciting the Qur’an, their
lack of knowledge about the scholarly traditions of Shia Islam, their over-indulgence in ritual
commemorations during Muharram, and their lesser regard for Islamic rituals such as
praying five times a day, giving alms, and fasting during Ramadan. He is multazim
(committed) in raising awareness by practising Islam in his daily life and by preaching to
fellow ShiaMuslims. This is done by sending themmessages on living piety-led lives using
social media like Facebook and through messages on WhatsApp.
The reformist narrative not only encourages fellow Shia to show iltizam by becom-
ing pious role-models for their brethren, it also seeks to erase what they consider to be
contaminating cultural practices. I met Hashmi, a local Shia activist and community
leader in Birmingham, who devotes his time to looking after the administrative matters
of a local husayniyya. Hashmi shared his frustration about ‘extremely deep-rooted
cultural practices’ among British South Asian Shia Muslims:
A small group of fellow Shia Muslims always meet and greet each other by
saying ‘Ya Ali Madad (O Ali, help us)’. I told them that the correct Islamic way to
meet and greet is by saying al-salamu ‘alaykum. Instead of getting embarrassed
they laughed at me and told me that they say Ya Ali Madad in public to let others
know they are Shia Muslims. It is a pity that they are doing a bid’at (innovation)
in the name of Islam. I told them that your love for Imam ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib
should not misguide you about true Islamic practices.
Hashmi told me that whenever he preaches Shia Muslims, they generally laugh at him
and call him a typical ‘molvi’ (prayer leader). He blames uneducated and illiterate zaker
(eulogy and lamentation poetry reciters) for encouraging these cultural practices in the
name of love for the ahl al-bayt.
The zaker’s role in a majlis is to recite marsiya (eulogy) and noha (lamentation)
before and after a learned Shia Islamic scholar delivers a lecture. After the scholar’s
lecture, the zaker continues reciting lamentation poetry about the martyrs of Karbala
while the mourners perform self-flagellation by beating their chests with their hands or
with sharp blades and knives. I heard similar condemnations and contempt for the zaker
from Abbas, another reformist Shia Muslim, at a London husayniyya. He discouraged
the inclusion of the zaker during Muharram commemorations:
The eligibility criteria of a prayer leader or anyone using pulpit for preaching
Islam in fiqh ja’fariyya [Shia school of jurisprudence] are that they should be
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knowledgeable, knows the Arabic language, most educated of all, and never
breaks promises. Most of the zaker using this pulpit do not have any formal
Islamic education, have no Islamic knowledge and most of them don’t practice
Islam in their life. Some of the zaker even don’t know how to recite bismillah (In
the name of God [religious formula to initiate actions]). This is simply a disgrace.
The organisers of the majalis pay huge amounts of money to these illiterate zaker
instead of spending money on providing Islamic education for children in the
husayniyya.
Like other reformist ‘ulama’ of South Asian background in the UK, Abbas condemns
the role of zaker during the commemorations of Muharram for a variety of reasons.
Traditionally, a zakerwhile recitingmarsiya or noha inmajalis in the UK is expected to
invoke the cultural memory of South Asian communities about ritual performance; to
reintroduce South Asian ways of commemorating Muharram rituals; to engage poeti-
cally in storytelling about Karbala using Urdu, Punjabi, Seraiki, Sindhi and Pashtu
linguistics expressions over English, Arabic and Farsi expressions; to quote examples
from life in villages in South Asia rather than sharing daily life examples of Shia
Muslims living in the UK; exaggerate the merits, spiritual stations, mythical powers of
the ahl al-bayt; and most importantly, belittle and undermine the Islamic practices like
offering prayers five times a day or reading the Qur’an. A zaker disseminates overall
religious subjectivities of Shia Islam infused with cultural sentimentalities. The dis-
seminations by a zaker in majlis are counter-productive for reformist ulama’s piety
driven agenda for the standardisation of Muharram rituals among British South Asian
Shia Muslims on the lines of Iranian official Muharram commemoration styles where
self-flagellation is forbidden.
The zaker endorses the zeal, emotionality and sentimentality shown by an individual
during Muharram commemorations as a sole criterion for being pious Shia Muslim. A
zaker’s narrative on piety suggests that it is not the number of prayers offered or verses
of Qur’an recited that will turn a Shia Muslim into a pious individual. On the contrary,
it is the number of tears dropped from eyes while crying for the martyrs of Karbala
during a majlis and the number of the drops of blood spilled by self-flagellations with
blades and knives on the day of ‘Ashura’, which will enhance the spiritual station of a
Shia Muslim in the eyes of the ahl al-bayt. A zaker’s understanding of iltizam for Shia
Islam and piety is qualitatively different from that of reformists. For a zaker, the
commitment with Shia Islam can be determined through the performance during
Muharram rituals with emotionality and zeal. Unlike the reformists, who view piety
among Shia Muslims in adopting Islamic lifestyle beyond the month of Muharram by
becoming a Shia Muslim , a zaker introduces an alternative sense of piety by being a
Shia Muslim.
Being Shia: narrative on living a piety-led life through Muharram ritual
commemorations
Despite the popularity of reformist narratives on living a piety-led life before and after
the month of Muharram, their acceptability, approval, reception and response is not
uniform and majority of British South Asian Shia Muslims reject them. These Shia
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Muslims interpret piety by embedding its merits into the continuity of their cultural
identity, historical experience, lived realities, local circumstances and an emphasised
distinction from Sunni Islam. For these Shia Muslims, the devotion and zeal with which
a Shia publically performs the rituals of Muharram, like crying loud and shedding tears
during majalis and performing self-flagellation, will determine the level of piety and
will inform others how multazim Shia that person is. Furthermore, this alternative
understanding of piety and public performances associated with it are not advanced in
response to the reformist narratives on piety. The emotional and zealous performances
during Muharram rituals are viewed as being a Shia Muslim.
To clarify, the two groups of British South Asian Shia Muslims with different
understandings on how to live a piety-led life are not necessarily in opposition to one
another in all aspects of religious life. On certain aspects of commemorating rituals of
Muharram like participating in majalis and leading Ashura processions on British
streets, both groups show solidarity. While moral ambiguity or clarity on how to act
like a true Shia Muslim in accordance with Islamic teaching determines the position of
an individual and opposition to other’s doctrinal beliefs, the social context plays a
pivotal role in informing the choice of an individual (Simpson 2008). At the same time,
there are certain issues around ritual performances where opposite narratives over piety
contest each other. These contesting ritual performances generate heated debates
between members of both groups, particularly around the issue of zanjir zani (self-
flagellation with blades and knives). This has led to a court case and litigation over the
control of the building and management of a husayniyya in London (Dogra 2017).
During an interview, my key informant, Akbar from South London, expressed his
dissatisfaction about the reformist Shia Muslims. Akbar has been a local Shia leader in
a South London husayniyya and was replaced by reformist ulama who took over its
administrative control. These reformist ulama and their followers were successful in
obtaining a barring order for Akbar and his associates from the courts, accusing them of
nuisance and encouraging violent extremist practices like self-flagellation in the name
of Shia Islam (Dogra 2017). Akbar said:
You see these so-called ulama are working on the agenda of Iranian religious
establishment with aim to have a monopoly over Shia Islam all over the world.
These ulama are always encouraging Shia Muslims to recite dua-e-kumail8 in the
husayniyya and in other public gatherings while they undermine reciting hadith-
e-kisa.9 I grew up in a household where my parents always recited hadith-e-kisa
every Thursday evening. Wherever you will see these Iran-backed ulama and
their Pakistani friends, you will see them reciting dua-e-kumail in the same way
as Sunni Muslim would recite taravih10 during Ramadan. They are reluctant to
8 Dua-e-kumail (the supplication narrated by Kumail ibn Zayad, a friend and loyal companion of ‘Ali ibn Abi
Talib) is a long supplication for gaining spiritual merits. This supplication emphasise the supremacy of God
and an individual’s devotion to God.
9 Hadith-e-kisa (narration of the people of cloak) is an account where Prophet Muhammad took his daughter
Fatima, grandsons Hasan and Husayn, and son-in-law ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, under a cloak and narrated that ‘God
desires to purify all of you, the people of my house’.
10 The extra supplications done by reciting Qur’an during the prayer after the mandatory evening prayer in the
month of Ramadan by Sunni Muslims.
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recite hadith-e-kisa because it elevates the ahl al-bayt (Prophet’s family
members).
For Akbar, Shia identity is distinct and is shaped by the historical experiences of
persecution at the hands of Sunni Muslims. For him, the Iranian religious establishment
and reformists only seek political influence by proposing a rapprochement with Sunni
Islam. Akbar believes that by doing so, they undermine the unique identity of Shia
Islam, as it developed in South Asia. He views that ulama trained in Iranian Shii
seminaries preach standardised ways of conducting majlis where zanjir zani [self-
flagellation] is condemned and praying five times a day and reciting Quran is encour-
aged. According to Akbar, this is Iranian religious establishment’s political agenda to
introduce a globally standardised pattern of commemorating Muharram rituals. He said
that after Iranian supreme leader Khamenei’s fatwa (verdict) on impermissibility of
self-flagellation in Shia Islam, British South Asian Shia Muslims started changing the
pattern of conducting majlis and rituals of commemorating Muharram rituals. For
Akbar and his friends in London, iltizam [commitment] for a Shia Muslim is to
continue performing the customary ways of doing matam [mourning for the martyrs
of Karbala] which for them is the one and only mark of identity for being a Shia
Muslim.
I interviewed Zafar in Bradford, a community leader and member of a local
husaniyya management committee who attends various religious, political and social
gatherings of Shia Muslims across the UK. He echoed similar sentiments about the
reformist’ disseminations on living a piety-led life before and after Muharram.
Matam [mourning] and zangir zani [self-flagellation with blades] are central to
Shia Islam. Every Muharram, it is the mourning for the martyrs of Karbala which
defines us who we are. It is disturbing that some Shia are emphasising more and
more reciting the Qur’an and saying prayers five times a day while undermining
matam. I would remind them that reciting Qur’an was a trick of the enemies of
Shia Muslims which they used during the Battle of Siffin.11 The Shia Muslims
once again have become victims of the same Sunni conspiracy. These ulama
expect Shia Muslims to practice Islam like the members of Sunni tablighi
jamat.12
The zaker (poetry reciter in majlis) driven alternative understanding of piety finds its
best defense when its proponents take inspiration from the life and work of Abu Talib
ibn Abd Al-Mutalib (539–619), the uncle and guardian of Prophet Muhammad and the
father of first Shii Imam ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. Sections of British South Asian Shia
Muslims applaud the life and work of Abu Talib as that of an alternative model of
living a pious life beyond the month of Muharram. Both Sunni and Shia Muslims agree
11 The Battle of Siffin (657 AD) was fought between first Shia Imam and Fourth Muslim Caliph, ‘Ali Ibn Abi
Talib and Umayyad forces led by Mu’awiya. The battle remained inconclusive. Ali’s army was about to win
the battle, when soldiers from Umayyad army displayed copies of the Qur’an on their spears and wanted
arbitration and negotiation. Upon seeing Qur’an, a section of Ali’s army stopped fighting.
12 Non-political but orthodox Sunni reformist and piety movement which call for its members to live their life
according to the teachings of Islam. Tablighi Jamat emphasis on saying prayers five times a day, reciting the
Qur’an, learning about Islamic teachings and encourage Muslims to adopt an Islamic dress and appearance.
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on the role of Abu Talib as that of a protector, guardian and defender of Prophet
Muhammad while the pagan Meccan elites wanted to assassinate or harm him. During
one majalis in Bradford, a British Pakistani Shia speaker, Kalib Abbas asserted:
Those who believe that Abu Talib did not recite shahada13 before he died, always
baffle me. What they do believe is that the Prophet was named as Muhammad by
his uncle Abu Talib. How can someone say shahada by using the name of
Prophet given to him by Abu Talib and at the same time believe that Abu Talib
died as a non-Muslim. When people tried to stop the Prophet from worshipping
Allah, Abu Talib said: ‘Don’t worry my nephew, worshipping to Allah is your
duty and defending you and Islam is mine and that of my children.’
Zafar told me that the over-emphasis on praying was the characteristic of Satan which
could not save him from becoming the enemy of Allah. The belief, affinity and defense
of Abu Talib for the Prophet Muhammad serves as a prototype and an ideal type of
alternative way of being pious which surpasses praying, supplications and reciting the
Qur’an. Some British Shia Muslims assert that Abu Talib did not engage in formal acts
of worship throughout the year, even though he was a Muslim, but is rewarded for
defending Prophet Muhammad and Islam. The same is also emphasised by zaker who
reject the standardisation of Muharram commemorations and belittle reformist’s narra-
tives on extending the notion of piety beyond Muharram. The popular belief among
British South Asian Shia Muslims is that defending Islam by advocating the superiority
of ahl al-bayt determines anyone’s commitment to Shia Islam. Iltizam for these Shia
Muslims is in continuity of the tradition of matam and preservation of historical Shia
identity which evolved and developed in South Asia in opposition to Sunni Islam. By
annual reenactment of Muharram rituals in line with their Shia brethren in South Asia,
these British South Asian Shia Muslims show they are multazim to Shia Islam without
subscribing to the reformist project.
The ethnography presents that iltizam-driven piety is possible to attain without
performing it daily and publically for those Shia Muslims who stand at the margins
of Islamic reform project. For Lambek (2000), performing moral behaviour by an
individual is a rational act of making a choice while negotiating and balancing various
other commitments in life. Hirschkind (2006) argues that people chose to listen to audio
cassette sermons by Muslim preachers in Cairo and the popularity of these cassettes
among Muslim audience was their attempt to induce Islamic normative subjectivity
pitted against secular viewpoints and ideals they confronted with in their daily lives.
Here, arguably, the recitation of zaker for South Asian Shia Muslims in the UK
inculcate living a piety-led life through their experiential, emotional and performative
understanding of being Muslim draws a parallel to the narratives on living a piety-led
life by pro-Iranian reformist ‘ulama’. This informs us that the practising Islam and
consuming piety in daily life can embed itself in experiential, discursive and subjective
micro realities with aim at balancing out meta-narratives of pro-Iranian standardising
Shia rituals without compromising being multizam (committed).
13 The words ‘I bear witness that there is not god but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God” which
every Muslim utters to declare his or her beliefs in Islam. The ritual utterance of these words is required for
anyone who converts to Islam.
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Understanding Muslim piety through iltizam
In available anthropological studies onMuslims societies or onMuslims living in western
contexts, the instrumental analysis of iltizam (commitment) results in piety-reductionism
whereby aMuslims’ lived experience with Islam is analyzed through their observable acts
of worship or by their association with any Islamic reform or revival movement (Deeb
2011, Schielke 2009). Iltizam, in these analyses, appears like a centripetal force that keeps
a Muslim rotating on the axis of Islam while a standardised interpretation of practising
Islam by reformists operates as the centre of rotation. This article explores the sense of
iltizam in the lives of Muslims who don’t subscribe to any Islamic reform project. I argue
that non-affiliation with any Islamic reform project among sections of British South Asian
Shia Muslims operates as centrifugal force that keeps them on/within the orbit of Islam.
From the reformists’ viewpoint or through anthropological observation obsessed with
what is visible and can be calculated and measured, these Shia Muslims might appear to
be on the margins or peripheries of Islam. However, the centrifugal nature of their
affiliation with Shia Islam helps non-reformist Shia Muslims to position themselves at a
distance from standardisation process of commemoration of Muharram rituals.
Anthropological studies on Muslim piety limit the prevalence of iltizam in the lives of
‘good Muslims’ through observing them from the prism of Islamic revival emphasizing on
prayers five times a day, fasting, supplications and reciting the Qur’an throughout the year,
and maintenance of so-called Islamic attire and appearance like hijab and beards. The
ethnography in this article informs that among British South Asian Shia Muslims, the spirit,
devotion and zeal of being a goodMuslim produces an alternative sense of their iltizamwith
Shia Islam. These Shia Muslims will trace ways of being pious in connection with the
historical experience of South Asian Shia Islam, emotional performances during Muharram
commemorations like crying loud during majalis and Ashura procession, shedding tears,
performing severe self-flagellation and opposing Sunni Islam. By doing this, British South
Asian Shii not only response to reformist Shii standardisation of rituals, but also maintain
and preserve their distinctive cultural ritual performances and opposition to Sunnis Islam.
This way of being multazim provides a plethora of meanings to ensure the continuity of
historical experiences embedded in peculiarity of just being ShiaMuslim and stay pious and
devout by commemorating Muharram rituals. For the rest of the year, these Shia Muslims
will reject and oppose the pro-Iranian reformist narrative of living a piety-led life by negating
what they view as Sunni ways of being Muslim. In both understandings of iltizam among
ShiaMuslims, commitment with Islamic identity remains central. Deeb (2006) and Schielke
(2009) locate the scope of being pious-modern Muslim with the Muslim reformists,
volunteers, activists and those who pledge their lives publically to practice Islam, individ-
ually or by affiliating with a group. This limits the prevalence of iltizamiltizam with Islam
among the religiously upwardly mobile Muslims only.
For Shia Muslims in the UK, being pious becomes a subjective experience and the
manifestation of pious modernity through ritual commemorations does not bind them to
subscribe to one particular interpretation of becoming Muslim. By just being a Shia
Muslim during Muharram, piety-led life is lived through preserving South Asian ways of
being Shia Muslim, without compromising historical continuity and culturally-specific
expressions of Muharram ritual commemorations. For reformist Shia Muslims, being
pious-modern becomes another religious landscape where they manifest and align with
globally standardising interpretations of becoming a good Muslim beyond Muharram.
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The recent anthropological writings on piety among various Muslim societies usually
confine the scope of analysis to observable expressions of public or individual piety which are
generally advanced by reformist or revivalistMuslims or associatedwith growing influence of
Salafi and other Islamic groups (Marsden 2005; Osella and Osella 2008; Simpson 2008;
Schielke 2009; Deeb 2011). The ethnography of this article suggests that without becoming a
part of Islamic reform project, SouthAsian ShiaMuslims in theUK live a piety-led life by just
being Shia Muslim without going through the trouble of becoming one. Stayingmultazim for
preservation of their religious identity is done by rejecting pro-Iranian standardising Shia
reformism and by maintaining their distinction to Sunni ways of Isalmisation of daily life.
Locating modern Muslim piety in observable, tangible or organised religious expressions of
Muslims would limit the scope of analysis of piety among Muslims communities to; a)
religiously upwardly mobile Muslims, b) generate Eurocentric positivistic epistemologies to
study pious daily life ofMuslims by focusing onwhat can be calculated or observed, c) reduce
it to a Habermasian framework to examine the Muslim public sphere and, d) overlook
alternative expressions ofMuslim piety, and e) will make anthropologists observe and analyse
Shii piety expressions on Sunni criteria and expressions of piety. Nonetheless, terming British
South Asian Shii who reject standardising reformist Shia narrative as secular, traditionalist or
‘backward’ Muslims will be insufficient and unwarranted to delineate their religiosity and
religious identity. I maintain that social, political and economic factors are at play for the
politically disenfranchised Shia Muslims who are opponents to the pro-Iranian reformist
narratives on living piety-led life beyond the month of Muharram in the same way as these
factors are instrumental in advancing the argument of proponents of Islamic reform.
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